The sale and repurchase (repo) market played a central role in the recent financial crisis.
Introduction
Repo finance is a multi-trillion dollar market that plays a central role in the modern financial system.
1 From the second quarter of 2007 to the first quarter of 2009, net repo financing provided to U.S. banks and broker-dealers fell by about $1.3 trillionmore than half of its pre-crisis total. We argue in a series of papers (Gorton (2010) , Gorton and Metrick (2010a , 2010b ) that this "run on repo" played a crucial role in the recent financial crisis. Significant details of this run remain shrouded, however, because many of the providers of repo finance are lightly regulated or unregulated cash pools. In this paper we supplement the best available official data sources with a unique market survey to provide an updated picture of the dynamics of the repo run. We provide evidence that the run was predominantly driven by the flight of foreign financial institutions, domestic and offshore hedge funds, and other unregulated cash pools. Our analysis highlights the danger of relying exclusively on data from regulated institutions, which would miss the most important parts of the run.
Repo is divided into two different components -"tri-party repo" and "bilateral repo" -with only tri-party having reliable data. In tri-party repo, a clearing bank stands between borrowers and lenders.
2
The tri-party segment is dominated by regulated institutions, and thus the data on tri-party repo is relatively complete. In contrast, bilateral repo is the home of hedge funds, many types of offshore institutions, and other unregulated cash pools. This data gap is significant, with an industry survey (discussed below) finding that bilateral repo was about three times as large as tri-party repo in 2004.
Section 2 uses Flow-of-Funds data to explore the dynamics of repo funding since 1999. These data combine all the main sources for tri-party repo with the available 1 A repo contract is an arrangement in which one party, the depositor or lender, provides cash to the other party, the borrower or bank. The contract is often overnight and is collateralized. So, the borrowing bank provides bonds with a market equal to or great than the amount of cash the depositor is providing. If the deposit is overcollateralized, there is said to be "haircut." E.g., if the borrower deposits $90 million dollars and the backing bonds are worth a market value of $100 million, then there is a 10 percent haircut. Other aspects of the repo contract are described in Gorton and Metrick (2012) .
2 Industry terminology uses the terms "repo" and "reverse repo" to refer (not always consistently) to, respectively, the sender and receiver of collateral. In the interest of clarity, we will avoid these terms, instead using the traditional terms of "borrower" for the party that receives cash and provides collateral, and "lender" for the reverse. "Borrowers" then have "repo liabilities" and "lenders" have "repo assets".
sources for bilateral repo. 3 Because the borrowers are mostly banks and broker-dealers, the flow-of-funds data on total repo liabilities should be relatively complete, even from bilateral repo. In contrast, the lenders come from both regulated and unregulated sectors, so that the official totals for liabilities (borrowers) typically exceed those for assets (lenders), often by a significant amount. This "statistical discrepancy" was the single largest contributor to total repo lending on the eve of the crisis, with an almost $1 trillion difference between reported assets and liabilities. Over the subsequent seven quarters, this discrepancy completely disappeared. So, a first-order (unsatisfying) answer to "who ran on repo?" is that "the statistical discrepancy ran on repo". We will attempt to improve upon this unsatisfying answer in Section 3. But even without the discrepancy there are some interesting findings from the flow-of-funds. In particular, the reporting institutions from the "rest of world" reduced repo assets by about $400 billion, while money-market-mutual funds -the largest reporting category pre-crisis -actually increased repo assets by more than $100 billion from 2007Q2 through 2009Q1.
Furthermore, gross funding by broker-dealers fell significantly more than did net funding, so that estimates of market size based only on net funding changes will understate the dislocations in repo markets during the crisis.
Section 3 attempts to shed light on the statistical discrepancy by comparing the flow-of-funds data with survey evidence from the Bond Market Association (BMA). The BMA surveyed its members on their use of repo as of June 30, 2004 . This survey asked major market participants about the identity of their counterparties, and then provided estimates of market size by counterparty-type. Counterparty data is not available in the flow-of-funds. The BMA did not distinguish between borrowing and lending and did not reveal its methodology for its market-size estimates, so it is not possible to make a direct comparison to aggregate data in the flow-of-funds. Nevertheless, the survey is invaluable for the view it gives into the composition of counterparties, particularly those that do not report through official sources. For our purposes, the key findings from the surveysubject to caveats explained in Section 3 -are (1) bilateral repo is about three times the size of tri-party repo; (2) money-market mutual funds comprise only about two percent of bilateral repo; and (3) hedge funds and other unregulated capital pools represent a significant fraction of the counterparties to dealers in bilateral repo. Section 4 concludes the paper, and an appendix supplements the text with a summary of data sources used for repo in the flow-of-funds.
Since the financial crisis, there have been several proposals for reform of repo markets, and a nascent debate about the role of repo in the financial system. 4 The most related paper to ours is Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2012) , who perform a detailed analysis of the tri-party and securities-lending market, focused most extensively on money-market mutual funds. Analyzing the same raw data that is used to build the summary statistics in the flow-of-funds, they find that money-market funds did not run on repo during the crisis. Based on this evidence, they conclude that repo runs were not central to the financial crisis, dismissing other possible contributors because "our own cursory investigations of other possible repo lenders has not turned up any other significant sources of funding" (p. 7). The evidence in our paper shows that this conclusion is premature, as it ignores the role of non-reporting institutions. Since moneymarket mutual funds make up only about two percent of the bilateral market, and the bilateral market is the main contributor to the $1 trillion statistical discrepancy that disappeared during the crisis, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the repo run by focusing only on money-market mutual funds and other regulated institutions.
Flow-of-Funds Evidence
The Federal Reserve flow-of-funds is the most comprehensive available source of repo data. Table L .207 from the flow-of-funds provides summary data from each of the following sectors: securities brokers and dealers, banks, rest of world, money market mutual funds, (all other) mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, nonfinancial corporate business, state/local governments, real-estate investment trusts, the monetary authority, and government-sponsored enterprises. In each category, flow-of-funds data is 4 Important aspects of the role of repo in the financial crisis and proposals for reform are discussed in Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) , Walker (2010,2011) , Hanson et al. (2010) , Hordahl and King (2008) , Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2012) , Martin, Skeie, and von Thadden (2012) , Perotti and Suarez (2011), Pozsar et al. (2010) , Pozsar (2011) , and Singh and Aitken (2010) . As MMFs were major holders of ABCP, many funds faced pressure to maintain par value, and at least 44 funds received material support from their sponsors (McCabe, 2012) .
After that support, MMFs appeared to be a safe haven and received an inflow of cash that was exiting other short-term investments. Some of that inflow made it into repo. In the panic that followed the Lehman bankruptcy, however, such sponsor support was insufficient. When the Reserve Fund was unable to maintain parity on September 16 and thus "broke the buck" by falling below $1 per share, an incipient run on MMFs was only averted by unprecedented government intervention. When this intervention arrived, the MMF industry stabilized, with its repo funding still above its 2007Q2 levels. Notwithstanding the large drops in reported repo funding from the institutions reporting in these categories, the most significant drop occurred for non-reporting cash pools. These pools end up as part of the statistical discrepancy in the flow-of-funds accounts, which saw a drop of about $1 trillion from 2007Q2 to 2009Q1. These nonreporting pools could be both foreign and domestic, and it is necessary to turn to nonofficial sources to get some sense of the composition of these pools. We turn to this task in the next section.
Survey Evidence
The Bond Market Association (2005) The other major categories of bilateral repo are "Other U.S." (6.8 percent) and "Other Non-U.S." (15.9 percent). "Other U.S." represents all domestic counterparties that have been left unspecified by survey respondents. "Other Non-U.S." is a catch-all category intended to lower the paperwork burden on survey respondents, by asking for less detail in the foreign section than the domestic section. This category includes foreign affiliates, foreign dealers, corporations, insurance companies, and managed funds.
In general, most of these capital pools would not be captured in the underlying flow-offunds data, and would also show up as part of the statistical discrepancy.
Overall, 40 percent of the bilateral repo in the BMA survey is in the categories of hedge funds or "other", with more than half of this amount coming from foreign sources.
Very little (if any) of this amount comes from known sources in the flow-of-funds. The statistical discrepancy of $1 trillion in the flow-of-funds repo accounts 2007Q2 is also about 40 percent of the total repo liabilities from reporting sources.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the "run on repo" during the recent financial crisis using data Our analysis demonstrates the danger of relying exclusively on official sources of data for repo markets. While it is tempting to focus where the data are strongest, such analyses can be misleading. For repo, the best data are for tri-party transactions, and the most detailed tri-party data exist for money-market mutual funds. As it turns out, MMFs were not at all representative during the crisis, with repo assets actually increasing for MMFs by more than $100 billion at the same time that overall repo liabilities were falling by $1.3 trillion. Table 1 .1 -Balance Sheet for Corporations in the NAICS Manufacturing Sector, All Total Asset Sizes. The services sector includes the following industries from the SOI : Information; Professional, scientific, and technical services; Administrative and support and waste management and remediation services; Educational services; Health care and social assistance; Arts, entertainment, and recreation; Accommodation and food services; and Other services. Unadjusted flow is the change in the level; data for the most recent ten years show no significant seasonality.
State and local governments, excluding employee retirement funds; federal funds and security repurchase agreements; asset Level is calculated as approximately 7 percent of total financial assets (FOF series FL214090093) based on detailed data for fiscal year 2003 on security RPs from CAFRs for the largest state and local governmental units. Unadjusted flow is the change in the level; data for the most recent ten years show no significant seasonality.
Savings institutions OTS reporters; federal funds and security repurchase agreements; asset
Level from OTS, Thrift Financial Report, schedule SC -Consolidated Statement of Condition, Federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell (series SVGL0439). Unadjusted flow is the change in the level; data for the most recent ten years show no significant seasonality.
Property-casualty insurance companies; federal funds and security repurchase agreements; asset Level from financial statements compiled by and purchased from SNL Financial. Series from Supplemental Investment Risk Interrogatories, Question 20, net admitted assets subject to reverse repurchase agreements plus dollar reverse repurchase agreements. Unadjusted flow is the change in the level; data for the most recent ten years show no significant seasonality.
Life insurance companies; federal funds and security repurchase agreements; asset Level from financial statements compiled by and purchased from SNL Financial. Series from Supplemental Investment Risk Interrogatories, Question 20, net admitted assets subject to reverse repurchase agreements plus dollar reverse repurchase agreements. Unadjusted flow is the change in the level; data for the most recent ten years show no significant seasonality. 
